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From Decision Theory to Game Theory: Reasoning about the Decisions of Others

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From Decision Theory to Game Theory shows how the reasoning patterns of common belief in rationality, correct beliefs and symmetric beliefs can be defined in a unified way. It explores the link between decision theory and game theory, particularly how various important classes of games (e.g., games with incomplete information, games with unawareness and psychological games), can be analysed from both a unified decision-theoretic and unified interactive-reasoning perspective. Providing a smooth transition between one-person decision theory and game theory, it views each game as a collection of one-person decision problems – one for every player. Written in a non-technical style, this book includes practical problems and examples from everyday life to make the material more accessible. The book is targeted at a wide audience, including students and scholars from economics, mathematics, business, philosophy, logic, computer science, artificial intelligence, sociology and political science.

  • Explains the many connections between three classes of games, allowing readers to analyze them in a uniform fashion
  • Provides a smooth transition from one-person decision theory to game theory
  • Provides in-chapter questions, and exercises to better help the reader understand the material
Συγγραφέας: Perea Andres
Εκδότης: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Σελίδες: 555
ISBN: 9781009522830
Εξώφυλλο: Μαλακό Εξώφυλλο
Αριθμός Έκδοσης: 1
Έτος έκδοσης: 2025
  • 1. Introduction
  • Part I. Decision Problems:
  • 2. Decision Problems
  • Part II. Standard Games:
  • 3. Common Belief in Rationality in Standard Games
  • 4. Correct and Symmetric Beliefs in Standard Games
  • Part III. Incomplete Information:
  • 5. Common Belief in Rationality with Incomplete Information
  • 6. Correct and Symmetric Beliefs with Incomplete Information
  • Part IV. Unawareness: Common 7. In Rationality with Unawareness
  • Part V. Psychological Games:
  • 8. Common Belief in Rationality in Psychological Games
  • 9. Correct and Symmetric Beliefs in Psychological Games.
  • Andrés Perea , Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands

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