Home / Social Sciences / Politics / Being Reasonable: The Case for a Misunderstood Virtue

Being Reasonable: The Case for a Misunderstood Virtue

AUTHOR
Price
€33.60
€37.30 -10%
Upon request
Dispatched within 15 - 25 days.

Add to wishlist

Reasonableness plays many roles in our lives. In Anglo-American law, it is the yardstick for a wide range of behavior—the “reasonable-person standard” governs everything from contract enforcement to killing in self-defense. In politics, a state can maintain a liberal democracy only if its citizens are reasonable. In ordinary life, we hold each other accountable to reason: We criticize the unreasonable of bosses who demand too much of our time or of partners who make decisions without regard for our preferences.

But what does it mean to be reasonable? Being reasonable is not the same as being rational. It is also different from being thoughtful. In Being Reasonable, Krista Lawlor argues that a reasonable person seeks to understand what is valuable. A reasonable person must be rational enough to figure out what is valuable and thoughtful enough to care about what other people find valuable, but rationality and thoughtfulness alone do not suffice to make one reasonable. Even an ideally rational and thoughtful person might fail to understand, or lack the concern to understand, what is valuable.

Being Reasonable is the first comprehensive study of reasonableness. Lawlor provides an account of the nature of reasonableness and, further, explains how we manage to be reasonable. Humans discover what is valuable by listening to their emotions and by listening to each other. By taking command over our emotions, and by interacting attentively with others, we can live up to the standard set by society and law.

Author: Lawlor Krista
Publisher: HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Pages: 224
ISBN: 9780674297470
Cover: Hardback
Edition Number: 1
Release Year: 2026
  • Krista Lawlor is Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University and the author of New Thoughts about Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts and Assurance: An Austinian Account of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims.

You may also like

You have recently viewed

Newsletter

Subscribe to the newsletter to be the first to receive our new releases and offers
Your account Your wishlist