Changing the Rules: Constitutional Amendments in Democracies

Περιγραφή

Changing the Rules enters into the debate between theoretical analyses of constitutional amendments (considered the most important part of a constitution) and empirical research (which argues that amendment provisions have little or no significance). George Tsebelis demonstrates how strict provisions are a necessary condition for amendments to have low frequency and significance and provides empirical evidence from case studies and over 100 democracies to corroborate this claim. Examining various cultural theories that dispute these findings, Tsebelis explains why their conclusions have weak foundations. He argues that constitutional rigidity is also a necessary condition for judicial independence and provides theoretical argument and empirical evidence. Tsebelis also establishes a negative correlation between the length of a constitution and problematic indicators such as time inconsistency, low GDP/capita, high corruption, inequality, and lack of innovation. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

• Offers a unique perspective on assessing constitutional rigidity by exploring the text of constitutional amendment provisions and demonstrates why other non-textual approaches cannot yet be used in comparative research
• Explains that constitutional rigidity is a necessary condition for the absence of significant and frequent constitutional amendments, as well as independent judiciary providing compelling evidence to reinforce the intuitive belief that 'institutions matter'
• Case studies and empirical results involving over 100 democracies support and corroborate the theoretical analysis
• This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core