Προσθήκη στα αγαπημένα
A familiar trope of cognitive science, linguistics, and the philosophy of psychology over the past forty or so years has been the idea of the mind as a modular system-that is, one consisting of functionally specialized subsystems responsible for processing different classes of input, or handling specific cognitive tasks like vision, language, logic, music, and so on. However, one of the major achievements of neuroscience has been the discovery that the brain has incredible powers of renewal and reorganization. This "neuroplasticity," in its various forms, has challenged many of the orthodox conceptions of the mind which originally led cognitive scientists to postulate hardwired mental modules.
This book examines how such discoveries have changed the way we think about the structure of the mind. It contends that the mind is more supple than prevailing theories in cognitive science and artificial intelligence acknowledge. The book uses language as a test case. The claim that language is cognitively special has often been understood as the claim that it is underpinned by dedicated-and innate-cognitive mechanisms. Zerilli offers a fresh take on how our linguistic abilities could be domain-general: enabled by a composite of very small and redundant cognitive subsystems, few if any of which are likely to be specialized for language. In arguing for this position, however, the book takes seriously various cases suggesting that language dissociates from other cognitive faculties.
Accessibly written, The Adaptable Mind is a fascinating account of neuroplasticity, neural reuse, the modularity of mind, the evolution of language, and faculty psychology.
Preface
Acknowledgements
1 Setting the scene
2 Aspects of neuroplasticity
2.1 SCOPE OF CHAPTER
2.2 THE NATURE OF PLASTIC CHANGES IN THE BRAIN
2.2.1 Definition
2.2.2 Synaptic plasticity
2.3 NEUROPLASTIC RECOVERY DURING DEVELOPMENT
2.4 CORTICAL MAP PLASTICITY
2.4.1 Intramodal plasticity
2.4.2 Crossmodal plasticity
2.4.3 Supramodal (or “metamodal”) organization
2.5 SUMMARY
3 Neural reuse and recycling
3.1 WHAT IS NEURAL REUSE?
3.2 THE MASSIVE REDEPLOYMENT HYPOTHESIS
3.3 FURTHER EVIDENCE OF NEURAL REUSE
3.3.1 Computational modeling
3.3.2 Biobehavioural evidence
3.3.3 Final thoughts
3.4 SUMMARY
4 Modules reconsidered: Varieties of modularity
4.1 A PIVOT TO THE NEUROSCIENCES
4.2 VARIETIES OF MODULARITY
4.2.1 Themes and trends
4.2.2 Graph theory and network neuroscience
4.2.3 Separate modifiability as the touchstone of modularity
4.3 THE BRAIN MODULE
4.4 SUMMARY
5 Modules reconsidered: Whither modularity?
5.1 DOES MODULARITY SURVIVE THE EVIDENCE OF NEURAL REUSE?
5.2 CAN COMPOSITE SYSTEMS BE DISSOCIABLE?
5.3 MODULAR NOTATION
5.4 SUMMARY
6 Are modules innate?
6.1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS
6.2 IMPLICATIONS OF NEUROPLASTICITY
6.3 SUMMARY
7 The language module reconsidered
7.1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS
7.2 DEFINING A LANGUAGE MODULE
7.2.1 The meaning of linguistic specialization
7.2.2 The domain of language clarified
7.2.3 Examples of elementary linguistic units
7.3 IS THERE A LANGUAGE MODULE?
7.4 IS LANGUAGE INNATE?
7.5 ACCOUNTING FOR LINGUISTIC MODULARIZATION
7.6 SUMMARY
8 Saving faculty psychology: Debunking the argument from multiple realization
8.1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY
8.2 MULTIPLE REALIZATION REVISITED
8.2.1 Preliminary remarks
8.2.2 Empirical arguments for multiple realization
8.2.2.1 Neuroplasticity
8.2.2.2 Convergent evolution
8.2.3 A conspectus of recent arguments against multiple realization
8.2.3.1 Outline of arguments
8.2.3.2 The argument from comparative psychology
8.2.3.3 The argument from grains
8.2.3.4 The argument from context
8.2.4 Conclusion
8.3 NEW LOOK FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY
8.4 SUMMARY
9 Summing up
References
Index
Περιγραφή
A familiar trope of cognitive science, linguistics, and the philosophy of psychology over the past forty or so years has been the idea of the mind as a modular system-that is, one consisting of functionally specialized subsystems responsible for processing different classes of input, or handling specific cognitive tasks like vision, language, logic, music, and so on. However, one of the major achievements of neuroscience has been the discovery that the brain has incredible powers of renewal and reorganization. This "neuroplasticity," in its various forms, has challenged many of the orthodox conceptions of the mind which originally led cognitive scientists to postulate hardwired mental modules.
This book examines how such discoveries have changed the way we think about the structure of the mind. It contends that the mind is more supple than prevailing theories in cognitive science and artificial intelligence acknowledge. The book uses language as a test case. The claim that language is cognitively special has often been understood as the claim that it is underpinned by dedicated-and innate-cognitive mechanisms. Zerilli offers a fresh take on how our linguistic abilities could be domain-general: enabled by a composite of very small and redundant cognitive subsystems, few if any of which are likely to be specialized for language. In arguing for this position, however, the book takes seriously various cases suggesting that language dissociates from other cognitive faculties.
Accessibly written, The Adaptable Mind is a fascinating account of neuroplasticity, neural reuse, the modularity of mind, the evolution of language, and faculty psychology.
