Personalized Law: Different Rules for Different People

Preface
CHAPTER 1: Introduction
PART I: INTRODUCING PERSONALIZED LAW
CHAPTER 2: What is Personalized Law
— Contextualization: The Old Precision Law
— Personalization: The New Precision Law
— Personalized Rules Everywhere
— Self Personalization
— Personalization & the Objectives of the Law
— Conclusion
CHAPTER 3: The Precision Benefit
— Personalized Everything
— The Benefits of Personalization
— The Benefits of Personalized Law
— The Production Cost of Precision
— Conclusion
PART II: PERSONALIZED LAW IN ACTION
CHAPTER 4: Personalized Legal Areas
— Tort Law “The Reasonable You”
—— Risked-based Personalized Standards
—— Skill-based Personalized Standards
—— Are Personalized Standards of Care Just?
— Consumer Protection Law
—— Two Dimensions of Personalization: Value & Price
—— The Potential Pitfalls of Personalized Consumer Protection
— Criminal Law
—— Benefit-Based Personalization
—— Detection-Based Personalization
CHAPTER 5: Personalized Regulatory Techniques
— Personalized Default Rules
— Personalized Mandated Disclosures
— Personalized Compensation
— Personalized Bundles of Rights and Duties
CHAPTER 6: Personalizing Rules by Age
— Age as Input into Legal Command
— Age as Output of the Legal Command
— Trouble with Using Age as Input
PART III: PERSONALIZED LAW & EQUALITY
CHAPTER 7: Personalization and Distributive Justice
— Personalized Rules & Relevant Criteria
— Conflicts Between Distributive Justice Goals & Other Goals
— Using Personalized Law to Advance Distributive Justice Goals
— Personalized Law & Discrimination
—— Suspect Classification
—— Data Echoing Historical Biases
— Fixing Uniform Laws’ Unequal Impact
CHAPTER 8: Personalized Law & Equal Protection
— The Constitutionality of Statistics
— Individualized Treatment
— Narrowly Tailored
— The Arguments for Differential Treatment
— Disparate Impact
PART IV: IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONALIZED LAW
CHAPTER 9: Coordination
— Coordination of Group Activity
— Coordination of Individual Acts
— Coordination & Information
— Coordination as Participation
CHAPTER 10: Manipulation
— Distorted Investment in Human Capital
— Pretending
— Arbitrage
— Ways to Restrain Manipulation
—— Immutable Characteristics
—— Hypothetical Characteristics
—— The Numerosity of Characteristics & Commands
—— Preventing Arbitrage
CHAPTER 11: Governing Through Data
— Information is Required for Lawmaking
— Where Will the Information Come From?
— Obeying Personalized Commands
— Privacy & Data Protection
—— People’s Interest in Privacy
—— Society’s Interest in Data Protection
CHAPTER 12: Legal Robotics
— Law & Artificial Intelligence
— The Human Design
— Tomorrow Morning

Omri Ben-Shahar is the Leo and Eileen Herzel Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School, and the Kearny Director of the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics. He writes and teaches in the areas of contract law, consumer law, insurance law, trademark law, food law, and law-and-economics. Ben-Shahar is the co-author of More Than You Wanted To Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (with Carl Schneider, Princeton Press 2014). Ben-Shahar is currently serving as a Reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts.

Ariel Porat is the Alain Poher Professor of Law, and the President of Tel Aviv University. He is a member of the Israel Academy of Sciences and the EMET Prize Laureate (2014). He teaches and writes in the areas of tort law, contract law, and remedies. Porat is the co-author of Getting Incentives Right - Improving Torts, Contracts, and Restitution (with Robert Cooter, Princeton Press, 2014) and Tort Liability under Uncertainty (with Alex Stein, Oxford University Press, 2001). In the years 2003-19, Porat was a Fischel-Neil Distinguished Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago Law School. He was also a visiting professor at the universities of Columbia, Stanford, NYU, Berkeley, Virginia, and Toronto.