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How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018 Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms, such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues that the proper aim of social punishment is to put moral pressure on wrongdoers to make amends. Yet the permissibility of applying such pressure turns on the tension between individual desert and social good, as well as the possession of an authority to punish. Responses from Christopher Bennett, George Sher and Glen Pettigrove challenge Radzik's account of social punishment while also offering alternative perspectives on the possible meanings of our responses to wrongdoing. Radzik replies in the closing essay.
Examines the overlooked moral phenomenon of social punishment in everyday life
Develops a distinctive account of desert that can be applied to topics beyond social punishment, including legal punishment
Extends the existing philosophy of punishment to contemporary phenomena such as 'call-out culture' and public shaming on social media
Preface
Part I. The Descartes Lectures 2018:
1. Defining social punishment
2. Justifying social punishment
3. Practicing social punishment
Part II. Commentaries:
4. How to do things with blame (and social punishment) Christopher Bennett
5. On social punishment George Sher
6. Punishment and protest Glen Pettigrove
Part III. Replies:
7. Replies to Bennett, Sher and Pettigrove Linda Radzik
Bibliography
Index.
Description
How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018 Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms, such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues that the proper aim of social punishment is to put moral pressure on wrongdoers to make amends. Yet the permissibility of applying such pressure turns on the tension between individual desert and social good, as well as the possession of an authority to punish. Responses from Christopher Bennett, George Sher and Glen Pettigrove challenge Radzik's account of social punishment while also offering alternative perspectives on the possible meanings of our responses to wrongdoing. Radzik replies in the closing essay.
Examines the overlooked moral phenomenon of social punishment in everyday life
Develops a distinctive account of desert that can be applied to topics beyond social punishment, including legal punishment
Extends the existing philosophy of punishment to contemporary phenomena such as 'call-out culture' and public shaming on social media
