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The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides an authoritative guide to it. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason to do or believe something. And one of the most contested ideas in philosophy is normativity, the 'ought' in claims that we ought to do or believe something. This is the first volume to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, action, and language, the Handbook explores philosophical work on the nature of normativity in general.
Topics covered include: the unity of normativity; the fundamentality of reasons; attempts to explain reasons in other terms; the relation of motivational reasons to normative reasons; the internalist constraint; the logic and language of reasons and 'ought'; connections between reasons, intentions, choices, and actions; connections between reasons, reasoning, and rationality; connections between reasons, knowledge, understanding and evidence; reasons encountered in perception and testimony; moral principles, prudence and reasons; agent-relative reasons; epistemic challenges to our access to reasons; normativity in relation to meaning, concepts, and intentionality; instrumental reasons; pragmatic reasons for belief; aesthetic reasons; and reasons for emotions.
Introduction, Daniel Star
Part I: The Structure of Reasons and Normativity
1:The Unity of Normativity, Ralph Wedgwood
2:The Unity of Reasons, Mark Schroeder
3:The Logic of Reasons, Shyam Nair and John Horty
4:The Language of Ought, and Reasons, Aaron Bronfman and J. L. Dowell
5:Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons, John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor
Part II: Reasons, Motivation, and Action Explanation
6:Internalism and Externalism about Reasons, Hille Paakkunainen
7:Motivating Reasons and Normative Reasons, David McNaughton and Piers Rawling
8:Psychologism and Anti-psychologism about Motivating Reasons, Eric Wiland
9:Reasons and Action Explanation, Benjamin Wald and Sergio Tenenbaum
10:Reasons and Ability, Bart Streumer
Part III: Reasons Fundamentalism
11:The Metaphysics of Reasons, Jonas Olson
12:Reasons Fundamentalism and Value, Philip Stratton-Lake
13:Reasons Fundamentalism and What is Wrong with It, John Broome
Part IV: Reasons Explained
14:Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations, John Brunero
15:Constructivism about Reasons, Nicholas Southwood
16:Constitutivism about Practical Reasons, Paul Katsafanas
Part V: Practical Deliberation
17:Practical Reasoning, Antti Kauppinen
18:Weighing Reasons, Garrett Cullity
19:Underdetermination by Reasons, Joshua Gert
20:Reasons, Choices, and Responsibility, Stephen Kearns
Part VI: Reasoning and Rationality
21:Reasons and Rationality, Jonathan Way
22:Norms, Reasons, and Reasoning: A Guide Through Lewis Carroll's Regress Argument, Corine Besson
23:Reasons and Theoretical Rationality, Clayton Littlejohn
Part VII: Epistemic Reasons
24:The Place of Reasons in Epistemology, Kurt Sylvan and Ernest Sosa
25:Reasons for Belief and Normativity, Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss
26:Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters, Errol Lord
Part VIII: Types and Sources of Reasons for Belief
27:Reasons and Perception, Declan Smithies
28:Reasons and Testimony, Sanford Goldberg
29:Knowledge, Understanding, and Reasons for Belief, Jonathan L. Kvanvig
30:Pragmatic Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner
Part IX: Types and Sources of Reasons for Action
31:Instrumental Reasons, Niko Kolodny
32:Teleological Reasons, Douglas W. Portmore
33:Subjective and Objective Reasons, Andrew Sepielli
34:Prudential and Moral Reasons, Roger Crisp
35:Agent-relative and Agent-neutral Reasons, Krister Bykvist
36:Reasons and Moral Principles, Pekka Väyrynen
Part X: Reasons Difficult to Categorize
37:Reasons to Intend, Ulrike Heuer
38:Reasons and Emotions, Christine Tappolet
39:Aesthetic Reasons, Andrew McGonigal
Part XI: Skepticism about Reasons
40:Reliable and Unreliable Judgments about Reasons, Caitrin Donovan, Cordelia Fine, and Jeanette Kennett
41:The Evolutionary Challenge to Knowing Moral Reasons, Terence Cuneo
Part XII: Normativity, Meaning, and the Mind
42:Normativity and Concepts, Hannah Ginsborg
43:The Normativity of Meaning, David Liebesman
44:Normativity and Intentionality, Anandi Hattiangadi
Description
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides an authoritative guide to it. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason to do or believe something. And one of the most contested ideas in philosophy is normativity, the 'ought' in claims that we ought to do or believe something. This is the first volume to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, action, and language, the Handbook explores philosophical work on the nature of normativity in general.
Topics covered include: the unity of normativity; the fundamentality of reasons; attempts to explain reasons in other terms; the relation of motivational reasons to normative reasons; the internalist constraint; the logic and language of reasons and 'ought'; connections between reasons, intentions, choices, and actions; connections between reasons, reasoning, and rationality; connections between reasons, knowledge, understanding and evidence; reasons encountered in perception and testimony; moral principles, prudence and reasons; agent-relative reasons; epistemic challenges to our access to reasons; normativity in relation to meaning, concepts, and intentionality; instrumental reasons; pragmatic reasons for belief; aesthetic reasons; and reasons for emotions.
