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There are two main ways in which things with minds, like us, differ from things without minds, like tables and chairs. First, we are conscious-there is something that it is like to be us. That is, we instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent, in various ways, our world as being certain ways. That is, we instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks attempts to make progress on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? How are the phenomenal and the representational related?
I: Two kinds of properties of subjects
II: From transparency to intentionalism
III: Intermodal intentionalism & nonconceptual content
IV: The metaphysics of representational properties
V: Availability and the scope of perceptual representation
VI: How many phenomenal relations?
VII: Phenomenal identity & indiscriminability
VII: The reduction of phenomenal properties
Description
There are two main ways in which things with minds, like us, differ from things without minds, like tables and chairs. First, we are conscious-there is something that it is like to be us. That is, we instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent, in various ways, our world as being certain ways. That is, we instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks attempts to make progress on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? How are the phenomenal and the representational related?
